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This paper models the pre-establishment period of start-ups. Starting and expanding a business is 
not easy in a world of tough competition. It is well-evidenced all over the world that many start-
ups end up with failures within the first couple of years of business. This suggests that there 
must be alternative avenues taken by the firms in successful industrial locations that have led 
them to experience less frequent business failures. One effective such avenue is to form informal 
networks. When they are developing their innovative ideas and preparing business strategies, 
potential entrepreneurs not only interact with each other and established firms but also they get 
help from established firms in obtaining finance. This paper analyzes how these informal 
networks form, and then provides the outcome of the market in the presence of these networks 
to see if they lead to better outcomes for the network members and for the society. 
 
I analyze the effects of ties between start-ups and established firms in geographic proximities, 
and their relationships with the local financiers and banks. On the one hand, for better chances 
of survival, new firms usually need enough liquidity, better technical expertise in production and 
business (such as pricing and marketing). On the other hand, successful regional economies can 
often be tracked down to one or two hub firms which form fertile environments that induce 
constant creation of new firms. These hub firms act as seedbeds for new ideas or start-ups by 
sponsoring the innovative activities of related individuals. They are the places where potential 
entrepreneurs meet when they are developing their marketable ideas. They advise related firms in 
their baby stages to prevent premature developments. These relationships usually end up with 
financial collaborations. Hub firms have good relationships with local financiers which they can 
use in finding finance for the projects of entrepreneurs in their networks. They may also invest in 
these start-ups if they see any exploitable profit opportunities. 
 
Explaining why a hub firm form such a network is not that trivial. In the presence of asymmetric 
information between the entrepreneurs and financiers, the market overvalues the start-ups with 
low success probabilities and undervalues the start-ups with high success probabilities. When the 
hub firm shares its views about the entrepreneurs in its network with the local financiers, the 
level of under and over-valuation is altered for the network entrepreneurs. As is shown in the 
paper, it sometimes makes both parties better off and sometimes only the start-ups with high 
success probabilities better off. When both parties are able to provide side payments to the hub 
firm, it is obvious that there are incentives for the hub firm to communicate its views to the local 
financiers in the former case since both parties are willing to provide side payments to the hub 
firm to induce it to do so. More importantly, even when two parties have conflicting interest, the 
side payments that the start-ups with the high success probabilities are willing to and able to 
offer to the hub firm to induce it to not to communicate its ideas to the local financiers is higher 
than that of the start-ups with low success probabilities to induce it to not to do so. This 
suggests that there are certain incentives for the hub firm to decrease the information gap 
between the entrepreneurs and the local. One potential problem in this is that the hub firm 
might not honestly share its views about the potential entrepreneurs in its networks with the 
local financiers. Nonetheless, the reliability is guaranteed whenever hub firms buy sufficiently 
large shares of the portfolio of start-ups in their networks that it claims to be promising which is 
consistent with what is observed in the early stages of industrial districts. 
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Abstract
This paper focuses on the pre-establishment period of start-ups in industrial dis-
tricts. The industrial architecture is what I call a "rationed agglomeration" in which
some entrepreneurs gather around an established rm while other entrepreneurs in
the same business stand alone. In a rationed agglomeration, I analyze the e¤ects
of relations between established rms, network entrepreneurs, and local nanciers
on the market prices of loans. I show that such relations improve the match of
capital to ideas in the network even though the overall distribution of capital to
ideas remains unchanged. This suggests that success breeds success in the networks
of established rms. The existence of networks overturns the claim that there are
no motives to engage in information gathering in a simple market regime with in-
formation asymmetries. In particular, I show that there are market incentives for
established rms to decrease the information gap between network entrepreneurs
and local nanciers.
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We [...] show how Clevelands initial locational advantages were magnied, perhaps
serendipitously, by a small number of successful enterprises that both exemplied
the wealth-creation possibilities of these new technologies and served as hubs of over-
lapping networks of inventors and nanciers. Focusing on one of the most important
of these hubs the Brush Electric Company we show how such enterprises served
multiple functions for the inventors who gathered around them. On the one hand,
they were places that fostered technological crossfertilization and the exchange of
ideas about how to solve particularly di¢ cult problems. On the other hand, they
were places where the technological community could pass on validate promising
ideas and thus perform a useful vetting function for local capitalists.
Lamoreaux, Levenstein, and Sokolo¤ (2004, pg. 2)
1 Introduction
One important economic phenomenon is that geographic proximity creates positive ex-
ternalities among rms. Sometimes these are physical spillovers in the form of low
transportation costs (Krugman, 1991); sometimes they are intellectual spillovers which
are more pronounced among rms that are close to each other (Glaeser et al., 1992).
In general, the main reason for concentration of rms near each other is the existence
of some sort of increasing returns to scale. This paper focuses on a di¤erent aspect
of agglomeration economies. Starting and expanding a business is not easy in a world
of intense competition. It is well-documented world-wide that many start-ups end up
as failures within the rst couple of years of starting business (see, for example, Bates
(2005), Brandt (2004), Headd (2003) or OECD (2006) for recent evidence).1 This sug-
gests the rms in successful industrial locations must have taken alternative avenues
that led them to experience less frequent business failures. One such e¤ective avenue
is to form informal networks to overcome the stigma of failure. When they are devel-
oping ideas and preparing business strategies, potential entrepreneurs not only interact
with each other and established rms but they also get help from the established rms
in obtaining funding. This paper analyzes how these nonmarket institutions (informal
networks) form, and then derives the outcome of the market in the presence of these
nonmarket institutions to see if they lead to better outcomes for the network members
and for society in general.
I analyze the e¤ects of ties between start-ups and established rms in close geographic
proximities, and their relationships with the local nanciers and banks. On one side,
for better chances of survival, new rms need enough liquidity, and better technical
expertise in production and business plans (such as pricing and marketing). On the
other side, the source of successful regional economies can often be tracked down to
one or two hub rms which form fertile environments that induce the constant creation
of new rms. These hub rms usually breed new rms with lower risk of failure by
improving the match of capital to ideas in their networks, and act as seedbeds for
new ideas or start-ups by sponsoring the innovative activities of related individuals.
These are the places where potential entrepreneurs meet when they are developing their
1There could be successful and unsuccessful closures. Even with that distinction, there is still a
signicant number of failures: between 30 to 40 percent of rms experience unsuccessful closures within
the rst couple of years of business.
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marketable ideas. They advise related rms in their early stages in order to prevent
premature developments that could end up in failures. These relationships usually end
up in nancial collaborations since it is known that most business failures are the result
of lack of access to either su¢ cient or cheap enough loans. It is well-documented by
Petersen and Rajan (1994) that ties between rms and their creditors are very important
for the availability and cost of funds. The hub rms have good relationships with local
nanciers which they can use in nding nance for the projects of entrepreneurs in their
networks. They may also invest in these start-ups if they see any exploitable prot
opportunities. This process results in higher success probabilities in the network.
The analysis boils down to a model of pre-establishment period of start-ups. The step-
ping stones of the model are based on the work of Lamoreaux, Levenstein, and Sokolo¤
(2004), who provide a wonderful historical case study of nancing innovation in Cleve-
land, Ohio in the ninetieth century, which was much like the Silicon Valley of its time,
and the role of networks in generating and nancing innovative ideas. They focus partic-
ularly on the Brush Electric Company, the inventors gathered around it, and the rms
that were somehow brought to life in the network of Brush Electric Company. Their
paper can also be viewed as the empirical support for the model presented here. I quote
passages from this paper wherever necessary to elucidate the assumptions and results.
The details of the model and the summary of ndings are as follows. The pre-establishment
period of start-ups is assumed to have two phases. In phase I, potential entrepreneurs
collect information about their subject matter. They not only develop innovative ideas
but also consider how to market and sell these ideas. They have two options in this phase:
they can either stand alone and develop their innovative ideas and business strategies
by themselves or they can join the network of a hub rm that provides a collaborative
environment with other would-be entrepreneurs. Phase I is similar to the R&D game
presented in Inci (2005) with some di¤erences. If an entrepreneur stands alone, his
benet results from his own e¤ort (which has a deterministic and a random component)
and the knowledge that spills over from the other nearby entrepreneurs. The degree of
knowledge spillover is higher among entrepreneurs who are in the same network, but
the benet that derives from their own e¤ort is still the same no matter whether they
are in or outside the network. However, there are costs to joining a network.
It turns out that, as a result of network externalities, any stable equilibrium has to be
a corner outcome. That is, either all entrepreneurs prefer to join the network or they
all stand alone. The reason for this is that an entrepreneur nds it benecial to join a
network only if su¢ cient numbers of others are doing so. Nonetheless a hub rm cannot
allow just anyone to join its network, which suggests that there will be some sort of
rationing process involved in joining the network. This is why we observe rms that
are related to each other as well as some others that stand alone in the same industrial
district. I call this industrial architecture a rationed agglomeration. At the end of phase
I, the random part of the individual benet is drawn by the nature, and thus, the types
of projects are determined. I assume for simplicity that there can only be two outcomes:
good or bad. Hence, there will be entrepreneurs with projects of high and low success
probability both in and outside the network. However, I assume that those with a good
drawing will be high in number in the network than outside the network.
Phase II of the pre-establishment period of start-ups involves seeking funding for the
business projects that are already in hand. In this stage, entrepreneurs have already es-
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tablished their networks, come up with their innovative ideas, and prepared the business
plans associated with these ideas. Phase II, therefore, focuses on a rationed agglomer-
ation in which there are more high-success probability projects in the network than
outside the network. This phase is a variation of the project nancing game of Inci
(2006). However, the population is now composed of two layers, network entrepreneurs
and stand-alone entrepreneurs. It is assumed that all projects are worthy even though
some of them have better chances of survival. E¢ ciency requires that all of these projects
should be nanced. So credit rationing is not an issue in this model.
Under normal conditions, entrepreneurs apply for bank loans to nance their projects.
There are, however, two important assumptions of the model. First, a hub rm has a
belief about the project type of an entrepreneur which may or may not be correct for this
particular entrepreneur, but its beliefs on average are informative due to its repeated
relationship with entrepreneurs in phase I. It can make useful judgments simply because
it has long years of business experience, although it may still make incorrect judgments.
The network membership of those who are believed to have low-success probability
projects expires automatically. Second, a hub rm has close relationships with local
nanciers to whom it can convey its beliefs about the entrepreneurs in its network.
This channel can decrease the information gap between the network entrepreneurs and
local nanciers. Then, if the local nanciers trust the information they get from the
hub rm, they will provide cheaper loans to those who are labeled as good by the hub
rm, and they decline the applications of those who are labeled as bad for privileged
loans. The declined group as stand-alone entrepreneurs may then apply for regular loans
that are readily available in the credit market either from the banks or local nanciers.
Being aware of these relations in the market, banks would then change their beliefs
about the distribution of types in the population since a better sample of entrepreneurs
are nanced by the local nanciers with cheaper loans due to their better information
about this sample. This means that the price of loans is higher for the stand-alone
entrepreneurs and for those who are declined for privileged loans. Therefore, the hub
rms signaling improves the credit market outcome of those who stay in the network
and worsens the outcome of the rest.
One other important point is that there will still be the same number of high and low
success probability projects in the region since the lenders prefer to nance both types
of projects. This suggests that the only positive e¤ect of the network comes from phase
I, in creating more high success probability projects. In phase II, networks may improve
their possible outcomes in the market; however, this may not be useful for the society
in general since the quality composition of entrepreneurs are still the same. Arnott and
Stiglitz (1991) show that nonmarket institutions may be dysfunctional when they are not
informationally advantaged over the market which is also the case in this paper if the
signals from the hub rm are not informative. Beyond that, what the model presented
here suggests is that even in the case in which the nonmarket institution is information-
ally advantaged (e.g.; relationships generate useful information), the outcome may not
be useful for the society at all. Hub-signaling can create islands of related entrepreneurs
that experience less frequent business failures and enjoy cheaper loans even though the
overall failure rate in the population remains unchanged.
In their empirical paper, Petersen and Rajan (1994) nd that banking relationships
are valuable, although they conclude that these relationships appear to operate more
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through quantities than prices.2 However, they implicitly assume that the decreases in
the cost of loanable funds are passed on to the borrowers, which is not necessarily to
be the case in the presence of monopolistic power over information. This is consistent
with the results derived here. Suppose there is only one local nancier that has access
to the signals of the hub rm. Since it has monopoly power on this information it
knows that the default rate in its loan applicant pool will now be lower, but it does
not need to reect this change to the borrowers. In that case, it can still nance the
same entrepreneurs with the same loan prices available in the market and make positive
prots.
When there is pooling equilibrium in the credit markets which is the case in this paper
 the market overvalues the start-ups with low success probabilities and undervalues
the start-ups with high success probabilities. The existence of networks may change
this situation. I show that hub-signaling always make entrepreneurs with high success
probability better o¤ by decreasing the level of markets undervaluation of their start-
ups. However, entrepreneurs with low success probability projects prefer hub-signaling
either when the network is large enough or when the signals are not very informative.
In such a case, both parties prefer hub-signaling, and side payments promised by them
can be su¢ cient incentives for the hub rm to organize hub-signaling. However, when
the networks are small or the signals are su¢ ciently informative, owners of the low
success probability start-ups prefer the status quo while the owners of the high success
probability start-ups prefer hub-signaling. Yet, I show that the maximum amount of
side payments that the latter group is willing and able to pay to the hub rm is higher
than that of the former group. This means that there are certain incentives for the
hub rm to form the hub-signaling mechanism. This result can be contrasted with the
nonexistence of a rational expectation equilibrium in Campbell and Kracaw (1980), and
as I show in this paper, it can be fairly generalized to a case in which extracting the
information about start-ups is costly for the hub rm.
I assume throughout the paper that the hub rm conveys its signals honestly to the
local nanciers. There are a couple of reasons to believe this. First, the hub rm may
have some repeated nancial relationship with the local nanciers. So, it may not be
in its best interest in the long run to act dishonestly. Moreover, acting dishonestly may
jeopardize its credibility in the market as well. Whenever the credibility of signals is a
problem, local nanciers may nance the start-ups if the hub rm is also investing in
those projects. If the hub rm believes that the entrepreneurs it recommends will have
better start-ups on average, it should be more than happy to invest in them. Section 5
shows that the signals of the hub rm are credible only if it has su¢ ciently large stakes
in these start-ups. However, this can happen only when the hub rm has su¢ cient
assets. Therefore, the established rms that can credibly organize hub-signaling should
be the ones with deep pockets.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sketches the pre-establishment period of
start-ups, which has two phases. Phase I the phase in which entrepreneurs work on
2 I focus on relationships between start-ups and an already established rm which has relationships
with local nanciers. The relationship in Petersen and Rajan (1994) is between lenders and borrowers,
not via a hub rm. The hub rms ideas about the entrepreneur that it conveys to the lenders should be
more credible than an entrepreneurs signaling of his own type. Moreover, Petersen and Rajan (1994)
focus on already established rms whereas I focus on start-up rms for which the data cannot capture
the relationship as the dene it. They dene the relationship as having at least one other nancial service
from the lender besides borrowing, such as depository services, factoring, or pension fund management.
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innovative ideas and prepare their business plans is modeled in section 3. Entrepre-
neursnetwork formation decisions and the resulting industrial architecture in the region
are also discussed in this section. Phase II the phase in which entrepreneurs apply for
business loans is modeled in section 4. In this section, the canonical project nancing
equilibrium from banks is derived as a benchmark followed by the analysis of the role
of established rms in entrepreneursloan applications to the local nanciers. Section
5 discusses the incentive scheme for the hub rm to organize hub-signaling assumed in
the previous sections. Costly signaling and the reliability of signals are also discussed
here as extensions of the model. Section 6 concludes. An appendix contains some of the
proofs.
2 A model of pre-establishment period of start-ups
I consider a simple model of a regional economy to model the pre-establishment period
of start-ups. There are two phases in this period. The rst phase is the idea genera-
tion stage in which potential entrepreneurs try to develop their business projects. This
requires not only engaging in invention projects that might end up with an innovation
with some economic value but also developing business plans such as pricing and mar-
keting strategies. Section 3 models this phase where I try to explain why we observe
di¤erent economic architectures across time and space. The focus of this part of the
model is at the aggregate level of a regional economy and it tries to provide some in-
sights on why there are some industrial districts where there is a number of rms in
a network gathered around established rms at the same time there are some others
standing alone in the same business matter. Basically, this part analyzes what I call a
"rationed agglomeration" (partial agglomeration of start-ups around some established
rms).
In the second phase, potential entrepreneurs have already come up with their business
ideas which are presumably risky. They are now in a position to look for nancing
possibilities for their risky projects. As I argue in the introduction of the paper, the main
obstacle in new rm formation is the relentless stigma of failure. Section 4 models this
start-up nancing game between entrepreneurs and lenders (banks and local nanciers)
in the presence of a rationed agglomeration around an established rm. I explain the
role of this established rm in nding (possibly) cheaper nance to the potentially better
entrepreneurs in its networks by conveying its beliefs about the quality of the projects
of the would-be entrepreneurs in their networks to the local nanciers.
What is below uses the words "entrepreneur", "rm", "inventor", "individual", and
"agent" interchangeably. Doing so does not make much di¤erence for my purpose since
I track the ow of business project itself and not its owners at di¤erent times in its
life cycle. In general, inventors come up with an innovative idea. Then, an entrepreneur
who may or may not be the same person with the inventor carries out the project.
Where it makes a di¤erence at all, the payo¤ structure of the model implicitly takes
into account the net e¤ects of economic interactions among any parties in exchanging
the business project with each other. I also use "entrepreneur" instead of "potential
entrepreneur" at some places for brevity. This is harmless since there is no credit
rationing in this model, and thus, all potential entrepreneurs will become entrepreneurs
no matter what happens.
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3 Phase I: innovative idea creation and business plans
[...] Inventors who were just starting their careers needed some [...] way to signal
that their ideas were promising. Here Clevelands industrial hubs played a critical
role. Because they were collecting points for technological expertise, they served an
important vetting function. Inventors seeking validation for their ideas gravitated to
these hubs. So did business people in search of protable investments. In this way,
the networks that formed around innovative rms like Brush Electric and White
Sewing Machine became engines of local economic development. They encouraged
the geographic concentration both of technological creativity and of venture capital.
They also matched inventors who had promising ideas with business people who
possessed the managerial skills needed to transform these ideas into productive
enterprises. (Lamoreaux, Levenstein, and Sokolo¤, 2004, pg. 35)
Suppose there is a region at the beginning of the period that can become an industrial
district if it experiences a constant formation of successful rms over time. What I
have in mind is a would-be agglomeration at the very beginning of its life-cycle that
can become a successful industrial district such as Silicon Valley of the present time or
Cleveland, Ohio of the late nineteenth century. As evidenced by Lamoreaux, Levenstein,
and Sokolo¤ (2004), such agglomerations can often be tracked down to one or two rms
which acts as incubators for new rms with higher success probabilities. For simplicity, I
assume that there is one such rm, which I call a hub rm and denote it by h. However,
the analysis can be generalized to a case in which there are more than one hub rm.3 If
this hub rm is unsuccessful, then, this is the end of the story. To model how success
breeds success, the rest of the analysis, thus, focuses on a hub rm which is known to
be a successful innovative rm.
There is also a unit mass of entrepreneurs who plan to engage in start-up activities
in an innovative sector.4 It can be biotechnology or nanotechnology sectors today,
and electric light, steel or chemistry sectors at the time of Brush Electric Company.
Start-up activities require pre-establishment period preparations. These preparations
can be anything related to the business project that entrepreneurs plan to employ in
the post-establishment period. Innovative idea generation and business plans (such as
marketing and pricing strategies) can summarize almost all of these pre-establishment
period activities.
Entrepreneurs are in a position to decide over two options in phase I: becoming a stand-
alone or a network entrepreneur. They can work on their projects alone in which case
they have to come up with their innovative ideas independently and prepare their busi-
ness strategies alone (call this as stand-alone entrepreneur). Alternatively, they can
approach to the hub rm where there may be other entrepreneurs working on similar
projects  and try to make use of the collaborative environment in terms of innova-
tive ideas and business plans by interacting with the other would-be entrepreneurs (call
3There is no harm to perceive the hub rm as a representative of all hub rms for my purpose in
this paper, just like we do for "representative consumer" in consumption theory.
4Continuum of agents is assumed for technical convenience. The analysis can easily be modied
to allow for discrete number of rms in which case one of the production factors should be innitely
indivisible to prevent technical complications
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this as network entrepreneur). Entrepreneur is own e¤ort creates a net benet with a
deterministic and a random part:
b(e) + "i 8i 2 [0; 1] ; (1)
where e is the level of e¤ort and b(e) is the deterministic part of the net benet from
e¤ort with b0(e) > 0, and "i is the individual specic random part of the net benet
from e¤ort. This specication allows that some entrepreneurs may end up with better
ideas even though all entrepreneurs are ex ante identical. A further specication of the
random part is given at the end of this section.
In addition to the benet that comes from e¤ort, entrepreneurs also benet by observing
the other entrepreneurs around. This is simply the usual story of spillovers, but here they
include not only technological knowledge but knowledge about business plans as well. I
call them knowledge spillovers altogether and denote the amount of knowledge ows to
an entrepreneur from another entrepreneur with . As usual, how much entrepreneurs
benet from knowledge spillovers depends on their ability to value, exploit and apply
the knowledge in their businesses. Denote absorptive capacity of an entrepreneur with
t. Given a unit mass of entrepreneurs working on business projects in close proximity,
the net benet of an entrepreneur from knowledge spillovers is
t 8 2 [0; 1] : (2)
Making use of (1) and (2), the total net benet of becoming a stand-alone entrepreneur
for entrepreneurs i is
V Si = b(e) + t + "i 8i 2 [0; 1] ; (3)
where superscript S denotes the set of stand-alone entrepreneurs.
The second option for an entrepreneur is to interact with the hub rm. Entrepreneurs
who will potentially engage in start-up activities can benet by interacting the estab-
lished rms in the pre-establishment period for various reasons. The rst and the most
important channel is the role played by established rms as mediums of exchanging
ideas. Lamoreaux, Levenstein, and Sokolo¤ (2004) reported how Brush Electric Com-
pany in Cleveland, Ohio fostered exchanging ideas to solve di¢ cult problems and acted
as a place for technological cross-fertilization in the era of Second Industrial Revolution.
This exchange is, of course, not and should not be limited with innovative ideas. Firms of
today do not have the luxury to learn how to sell innovative ideas by trial and error. For
successful organizations, they have to develop marketable ideas that are backed up with
strong business plans. For example, stable pricing and marketing strategies play crucial
roles in determining the survival chances of start-up rms. Network entrepreneurs can
learn or develop those techniques from other entrepreneurs in the network.
All of these create incentives for potential entrepreneurs to gather around established
rms to exploit the knowledge exists in them. This may also be benecial to the es-
tablished rms since they can increase their stock of knowledge in this process of cross-
fertilization of ideas. All in all, we observe that some would-be entrepreneurs are part
of a network in which one or two established rms are the crucial nodes. There are,
of course, costs and benets associated with being a member of this network for both
parties. To highlight the results without unnecessary complications, this paper models
the costs and benets that accrue to the start-ups but takes the hub rms decision
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as granted. Section 3.2 incorporates hub rms decision and section 5 explores if there
are incentives for hub rm to arrange this network. Moreover, there may be rationing
in membership to this network. Presumably, established rms would not want to al-
low any number of entrepreneurs to join their networks. Not only because they might
not have the resources for that but also because too many entrepreneurs interacting in
the network may create congestion in exchanging ideas even when all entrepreneurs are
identical.
When entrepreneurs join the network, they still need to provide the same e¤ort in their
pre-establishment period preparations. However, the benet of being a part of the
network allows them to benet more from the knowledge of the network entrepreneurs.
To capture these ideas, I assume that the knowledge spillover between network rms,
denoted by , is greater than . However, being a part of the network is costly. It is
much like a club membership and all members have to pay a fee to enter the network,
though the cost of entering this network need not to be pecuniary. It may well be
the time and congestion costs associated with repeated interactions with other network
members.
Let the ratio of entrepreneurs who choose to become a network entrepreneur be .
Hence, the total net benet of becoming a network entrepreneur for entrepreneur i is
V Ni = b(e) + t[+ (1  )]  c+ "i 8i; ;  2 [0; 1] ^  >  ; (4)
where superscript N denotes the set of network entrepreneurs and c is the cost of en-
trering the network. This specication implies that knowledge may not spill over in the
same extent within and outside the network which is consistent with Acs et al. (2005)
that show that the spillover of knowledge may not occur automatically as has typically
been assumed in endogenous growth models.
Some comments on the random part of the benet from e¤ort are in order. I assume
that entrepreneurs but no one else learn "i once they nalize their business plans but
before they apply for business loans. I further assume that  of the network entrepreneurs
will have a good draw, "i = "H > 0, and the rest will have a bad draw, "i = "L < 0,
such that "Ni := E["i j i 2 N ] = "H +(1  )"L, where subscript H is for high type and
subscript L is for low type. However, I assume that  of the stand-alone entrepreneurs
will have a good draw and the rest will have a bad draw such that "Si := E["i j i 2 S] =
"H + (1  )"L. Therefore, by the law of large numbers
Pr("i = "H) =

 if i 2 N
 if i 2 S 8i 2 [0; 1] ^  <  : (5)
I assume that  and  are common knowledge.5  <  is assumed to capture the network
e¤ect. It is well-known that successful networks have disproportionately more high-type
individuals even though some stand-alone individuals can still achieve the same degree
by themselves outside the network.6 Note that "Ni > "
S
i . For future reference, dene
the di¤erence between "Ni and "
S
i as " for brevity of the equations. The analysis below
5This assumption is nothing but the conventional assumption in contract theory that the distribution
of types are publicly known.
6Here is an analogy. A randomly selected researcher in the NBER network is more likely to be a
better researcher, but this, by all means, does not mean that there cannot be other better researchers
outside this academic alliance.
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focuses on the cases in which c > ".7
3.1 Network formation
I assume that the cost of joining the network is less than its net benet, which is stated
in the following assumption.
Assumption 1 t(  ) + " > c.
Given the specied net benet scheme in the previous section, the network formation
equilibrium is the ratio of entrepreneurs in the network, , such that none of the
entrepreneurs have incentive to change their decisions on whether or not to join the
network. At this phase, entrepreneurs do not yet have information about the random
part of their net benet from e¤ort. Assuming that they are risk-neutral expected utility
maximizers, in any equilibrium the following inequality must hold.
maxfEV Si ();EV Ni ()g  maxfEV Si ();EV Ni ()g 8i;  2 [0; 1] : (6)
In an interior equilibrium, EV Si (
) = EV Ni (
) has to be satised. This implies that
an interior equilibrium is obtained when
 =
c "
t(  ) : (7)
However, network externalities prevent this to be a stable equilibrium. Suppose the
economy is in the interior equilibrium with  entrepreneurs in the network and the
rest stands alone. If an entrepreneur decides to stand alone instead of joining the
network, the expected net benet of each of the other entrepreneurs in the network
decreases by t( ) while the expected net benet of stand-alone entrepreneurs remains
unchanged. If, on the other hand, an entrepreneur does the opposite, the expected
net benet of each of other entrepreneurs in the network increases by t(   ) while
that of stand-alone entrepreneurs remains unchanged. Therefore, the interior solution
 = (c ")=(t(  )) cannot be a stable equilibrium. Then, any stable equilibrium
of network formation has to be a corner solution either with all entrepreneurs prefer to
join the network ( = 1) or none of them prefer to join the network ( = 0).
Proposition 1 (Agglomeration vs. Dispersion) There are multiple equilibria of net-
work formation and any stable equilibrium has to be a corner solution. Therefore, either
all entrepreneurs agglomerate around the hub rm or all of them stands alone.
A graphical characterization of the equilibria is shown in Figure 1. The number of
entrepreneurs forming links with the hub rm is given in the x-axis and entrepreneurs
expected payo¤s are given on the y-axis. AB is the expected payo¤ of an entrepreneur
when he joins the network. As expected, it is increasing in the number of entrepreneurs
in the network. On the other hand, the payo¤ of an entrepreneur when he stands alone,
which is represented by CD in the gure, is independent of the number of entrepreneurs.
Since joining the network is costly, AB starts below CD.
7The case in which c < " is trivial and the analysis of it is left to the reader.
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Figure 1: Network formation equilibria
There has to be su¢ ciently higher number of entrepreneurs in the network (e.g.; at least
(c ")=(t(   )) entrepreneurs) to make an entrepreneur at least as better of as he
could be outside the network. Therefore, there is a coordination problem caused by
network externalities: joining the network is individually rational only if enough others
do so. As stated in Proposition 1, there are three di¤erent equilibria one of which is not
stable. A stable equilibrium is obtained either when all entrepreneurs stand alone or all
join the network. The former happens at point C and the latter happens at point D
in the gure, both of which are corner solutions. An interior solution occurs where AB
intersects CD, which happens at point E. However, it is not stable since even a small
perturbation or a shock to the system could lead the economy out of this equilibrium
due to the snow ball e¤ect.
3.2 Network architecture: rationed agglomeration
Previous section assumes an open-club-type of a network. Any entrepreneur who is
willing to join the network can join. However, this neglects the decision of the hub rm.
To incorporate that, assume for the moment that the economic problem of the hub rm
prevents it from forming links with all rms and suppose that it is willing to create links
only with  of the entrepreneurs.
If  < (c  ")=(t(   )), then, there will be a complete dispersion of entrepreneurs.
Such a situation is shown in Figure 2. Suppose the hub rm is willing to form links
with 1 entrepreneurs. Then, the equilibrium has to happen at point C and it is the
unique and stable equilibrium of network formation in this case. This is a case with low
knowledge spillovers. Entrepreneurs cannot benet much from the knowledge base of
the network since the number of entrepreneurs allowed in the network is not su¢ cient
for enough knowledge spillovers. In that sense, this is a bad equilibrium with no col-
laboration. An industrial district with these characteristics would probably experience
lower growth rates.
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Figure 2: Hub rms decision and network formation
If   (c ")=(t(  )), then  entrepreneurs will be able to form links even though
all entrepreneurs would prefer forming links with the hub rm. Figure 2 shows this
situation. Suppose the hub rm is willing to form links with 2 entrepreneurs. Then, a
stable equilibrium occurs at point D. This means that 1  2 entrepreneurs will not be
able to join the network even though they want to. This suggests that there should be
some kind of rationing by the hub rm in its selection process of entrepreneurs
Denition 1 (Rationed Agglomeration) A rationed agglomeration is an agglomer-
ation of limited number of entrepreneurs around the hub rm(s) even though all entre-
preneurs want to do so.
Under our assumption of identical entrepreneurs, the best the hub rm can do is a
random rationing like in the models of credit rationing à la Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
Models of agglomeration usually predict either complete agglomeration or complete
dispersion of entrepreneurs whenever there is a corner solution. Here, what I propose
is somewhat di¤erent than those predictions and is more consistent with reality. What
we observe in reality is some entrepreneurs that are related to each other and some
others in the same sectors that stand alone. If agglomeration forces make forming links
benecial for an entrepreneur it has to do the same thing for all the others which are
assumed to be identical in all respects. Nonetheless, even though agglomeration forces
lead entrepreneurs to one or the other corner, some sort of rationing mechanism may
prevent such outcomes. This makes ex ante identical entrepreneurs di¤erent ex post.
Then, we end up with a corner solution which looks like an interior solution.8
Note that whenever   (c   ")=(t(   )) in addition to the ones I analyze above,
point E would still be an equilibrium, but, as discussed before, it is unstable unless
8This can also be viewed as a gentlemen club or an academic alliance such as NBER. Even though
many similar individuals prefer to be a part of them, there will be room only for a limited number of
them. Then, the institution applies some rationing rule which may or may not be random.
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 = (c   ")=(t(   )) and is left aside in the analysis below. The results of this
section are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Rationed Agglomeration) If  < (c ")=(t( )), there is com-
plete dispersion of entrepreneurs. If   (c ")=(t(  )), only  entrepreneurs can
form links with the hub rm even though all of them prefer forming links. Then, there
is agglomeration around the hub rm at the same time with some other entrepreneurs
standing alone outside the network.
Finally, some comments on the multiplicity of equilibria are in order. The possibility of
multiple equilibria explains why we observe di¤erent industrial architecture in di¤erent
places and in di¤erent times. Whenever a dispersion equilibrium occurs (point C in
Figure 2), entrepreneurs do not collaborate with each other. In other equilibria (either
unstable equilibrium of point E or stable equilibrium of point D), there is high collabo-
ration between entrepreneurs. Any unstable equilibrium will sooner or later be broken,
which explains why some industrial clusters change their structure in very short period
of time. These equilibria can also be ranked in terms of entrepreneurswelfare. Points
C and E give the same aggregate payo¤ to the entrepreneurs. However, at point D,
network entrepreneurs get higher payo¤s and stand-alone entrepreneurs get exactly the
same payo¤s that they would get in points D and E. Therefore, the aggregate welfare
of entrepreneurs is higher in point D than points C and E. In that sense, I conclude
that C and E as ine¢ cient equilibria by noting that this analysis neglects the payo¤ of
the hub rm.9
The above analysis implicitly assumes a star network structure among the entrepreneurs.
In a star network, one player (in this case the established rm) is at the center of
the network and the others (in this case entrepreneurs) gather around it. This is not
only a plausible network architecture that we observe in industrial clusters but also
theoretically justiable. Bala and Goyal (2000) work on very general payo¤ structures
of noncooperative network formation games. They show that in a model of two-way
knowledge spillovers, the strong Nash equilibrium of a network structure tend to be either
an empty network in which none of the agents are connected to each other (coincides
with the complete dispersion result of Proposition 2) or a star network (coincides with
the agglomeration result of Proposition 2).
4 Phase II: nancing of business projects
[...] before they would be willing to invest in new technological ventures, wealthy
individuals had to be convinced of two things: rst and most obviously, that it
9Nonetheless, note that to be able to get this result I do not even need a hub rm. Even in
the absence of a hub rm, this result says that entrepreneurs might be better o¤ by interacting with
each other but they can end up with an ine¢ cient equilibrium of no cooperation due to coordination
problems. One might, therefore, be tempted to predict that entrepreneurs can cooperate by solving this
coordination problem. Although it seems possible in this simple framework of identical entrepreneurs
such an incentive vanishes in richer environments with heterogenous agents. The simple reason for this
is that coordination might not make all entrepreneurs but only a subgroup of them better o¤ in which
case it is not supported by all (or possibly by the majority).
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was indeed possible to earn high rates of return by putting their money in this
kind of enterprise; [...] by serving as the hub of overlapping networks of inventors
and investors, [hub rms] could both stimulate ongoing inventive activity and pro-
vide the expertise needed to assess the economic merits of the resulting discoveries.
(Lamoreaux, Levenstein, and Sokolo¤, 2004, pg. 14)
In the second phase of the pre-establishment period of start-ups, entrepreneurs seek for
nance for their risky investment projects. At this stage, they have already developed
their business projects, established their network and nalized their business strategies.
This means that they now know what kind of a project they have: a promising project
with high success probability or a not so well project with a lower success probability.
The way I model this is the following. At the end of phase I, entrepreneurs learn random
part of their net benets from e¤ort, which is denoted with "i in eq. (1). Remember
that the expected value of this random term is assumed to be zero no matter whether an
entrepreneur is in the network or not. I assume that there is a one-to-one mapping from
net benets of the entrepreneurs to the success probability of their start-ups. Those
who experiences a good draw, "H , will have a success probability of pH , and those who
experiences a bad draw, "L, will have a success probability of pL where pH > pL. That
is,
pi =

pH if "i = "H
pL if "i = "L
8i 2 [0; 1] : (8)
The base model here thus boils down to a canonical project nancing model with two
types: entrepreneurs with high success probability projects and entrepreneurs with low
success probability projects. However, there are two di¤erences. First, entrepreneurs
acquire their types from their interactions in phase I. Second, the distribution of project
types di¤ers according to the entrepreneurspast decisions on whether to join the net-
work or not. That is,  of the network entrepreneurs have a high success probability
project whereas only  of the stand-alone entrepreneurs have a high success probability
project.
To focus on the interesting cases, from now on, I assume that   c=(t(   )), and
thus, there are  network entrepreneurs and 1    stands-alone entrepreneurs. Given
this, there are  entrepreneurs in the network whose projects have a high success
probability and (1  ) entrepreneurs in the network whose projects have a low success
probability. The corresponding numbers for the stand-alone entrepreneurs are (1  )
and (1   )(1   ), respectively. Therefore, the overall number of entrepreneurs with
high success probability projects in the whole population is
 + (1  ) ; (9)
and that of entrepreneurs with low success probability projects is
(1  ) + (1  )(1  ) : (10)
To be able to undertake the project a potential entrepreneur has to have I units of
capital. It is assumed for simplicity that all entrepreneurs have no wealth. Therefore,
they need to borrow I units of capital from a lender. In the base model, I assume
that they nance their projects from one source which is consistent with the ndings
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of Petersen and Rajan (1994) on small business nancing. The cost of loanable funds
is equal to the risk-free (gross) interest rate R in the economy. If entrepreneurs are
successful, the project yields Y units of capital at the end of the period and if not it
yields a small return, which is normalized to zero here. I also assume that all projects
have a positive net present value which is stated in the following assumption.
Assumption 2 (NPV of Projects) pHY > pLY > RI.
Therefore, it is not only that all entrepreneurs prefer undertaking their projects had
they could fully self-nance their projects by themselves but also that lenders prefer
nancing all projects. Therefore, the focus of this paper is not the ine¢ ciencies rise
up due to melons problem but simply the pricing problem of di¤erent projects and the
resulting incentive scheme that induces certain network structure.10 As it is shown later,
the start-ups of the entrepreneurs with high success probability projects are undervalued
due to the cross-subsidization erected by pooling contracts in the credit market.
4.1 Sequence of events
The sequence of the events in phase II is as follows. Since every entrepreneur is assumed
to have no wealth they all need to borrow to start their rms. At the beginning of
the phase II, entrepreneurs sign nancial contracts with lenders. Then, they make their
investments. Successful entrepreneurs pay o¤ their loans once their payo¤s are realized.
4.2 Lenders (banks and local nanciers)
There are risk neutral lenders in Bertrand competition with each other. They can be
either banks or local nanciers. They simultaneously form their beliefs and choose the
contracts they will be o¤ering taking the cost of loanable funds, which is equal to the
risk-free interest rate of R, as given. At the moment, both banks and local nanciers
are assumed to have the same information set. However, later the analysis takes into
account the possibility that local nanciers can make use of local information that they
can gather from their relationships with the hub rm. They o¤er contracts contingent
on the announced type of an entrepreneur and the outcome (either success or failure)
of their projects. Contracts specify the repayments to the lenders in both states of the
world. Let the repayment to the lender be DGi (R) in the good state and D
B
i (R) in the
bad state where G is for good, and B is for bad. The general form of the contract o¤ered
by lender l is
C l 

CH
CL

=

DGH(R) D
B
H(R)
DGL (R) D
B
L (R)

(11)
where CH is the contract designed for loan applicants with a high success probability
project and CL is that for loan applicants with a low success probability project. I
assume that there is limited liability, and, therefore, contracts cannot leave entrepreneurs
with negative end-of-period payo¤s:
Gi  0 and Bi  0 8i = H;L ; (12)
10 Inci (2006) focuses on this ine¢ ciencies by assuming that the low success probability start-ups have
negative net present value. Note also that the problem here does not entail any credit rationing.
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where Gi is the payo¤ of an entrepreneur in the good state and 
B
i is the payo¤ of an
entrepreneur in the bad state.
4.3 Entrepreneurs
The payo¤ of an entrepreneur, , is given by
 = pi(Y  Dki (R))  (1  pi)Dki (R)  0 8i = H;L 8k = B;G : (13)
An entrepreneur is going to be successful with probability pi in which case he produces
Y . He gives Dki to the bank. Thus, the expected net return in case of a good state is
pi(Y  Dki ). If he is unsuccessful he produces something less than Y (which is normalized
to zero) and gives Dki of it to the bank. However, limited liability prevents D
k
i to be
higher than what the entrepreneur has. Since the low output is normalized to zero Dki
is going to be zero as well but for the sake of generality of the analysis I keep it.
4.4 Equilibrium denition
I use the standard Bertrand-Nash equilibrium concept. An equilibrium is the contract
o¤ers by lenders that are consistent with each other. Each lender o¤ers entrepreneurs a
contract that maximizes their prots. Then, among all alternatives entrepreneurs choose
the best contract for them. Formally, an equilibrium in the credit market is dened as
follows.
Denition 2 (Equilibrium Concept) Assume that lenders are Bertrand-Nash play-
ers following pure strategies. Given R, a credit market equilibrium is the contract o¤ers
by lenders such that all contracts earn nonnegative prots and there are no new contracts
that could earn higher prots.
An equilibrium has to be individually rational and incentive compatible for every entre-
preneur. After normalizing the payo¤ of the entrepreneur in case of inactivity to zero,
individual rationality asserts that an entrepreneur i can earn at least as much as he
could when he does not participate in the market at all:
pi(Y  DGi (R))  (1  pi)DBi (R)  0 8i = H;L : (14)
Incentive compatibility assures that entrepreneur i does not have incentive to apply for
the loan contract aimed for entrepreneurs j:
pi(Y  DGi (R)) (1 pi)DBi (R)  pi(Y  DGj (R)) (1 pi)DBj (R) 8i; j = H;L : (15)
Under these conditions, it is impossible to design contracts such that entrepreneurs with
di¤erent projects in terms of success probabilities self select themselves into di¤erent
contracts. Therefore, it is impossible to identify an entrepreneur with a high success
probability project since it is always benecial for an entrepreneur with a low success
probability project to misrepresent himself as if he had a high success probability project.
Lemma 1 proves this claim.
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Lemma 1 There exist no separating equilibrium in the credit market.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
4.5 Start-up nancing without hub-signaling
As a benchmark start of with the case in which there is a network but the hub rm
has no role in start-up nancing. In this case entrepreneurs simply apply for loans by
themselves. From Lemma 1, it is known that the only possibility is a pooling contract
which imposes DGH(R) = D
G
F (R) = D
G and DBH(R) = D
B
L (R) = D
B. Figure 3 derives
the pooling equilibrium. ZPp is the zero prot condition with both types of projects
above which the prot of the lender increases and under which it decreases. ZPp is given
by
pDG + (1  p)DB = RI ; (16)
where p is the average success probability of the projects of the loan applicant pool. The
applicant pool is composed of both network and stand-alone entrepreneurs. By making
use of (9) and (10), this average success probability can be written as
p = [ + (1  )]pH + [(1  ) + (1  )(1  )]pL : (17)
To nd out the pooling equilibrium, start of with an arbitrary contract, say, C1. The
iso-prot lines passing through C1 are shown in Figure 3. The steeper one is for a low
success probability project and the less steep one is for a high success probability project.
C1 cannot be an equilibrium since there is a deviation contract C2 at the north-west of
it which is attractive for an entrepreneur with a high success probability project but not
for an entrepreneur with a low success probability project. There exist such deviation
contracts as long as the contract is not on the y-axis. There is no such deviation contract
on the y-axis since contracts have to be in the rst quadrant due to limited liability.
However, any contract there, such as C3, cannot be an equilibrium as long as it makes
positive prots since it can be under cut by Bertrand competition. Zero prots are
obtained at the intersection of ZPp and the y-axis which I denote with C. The pair
of iso-prot lines passing through C are shown with the lines HH 0 and LL0 for a high
and a low success probability project, respectively, in the gure.
The equilibrium pooling contract takes the simple debt form with a repayment of RI=p
in the good state and zero repayment in the bad state:
DS = RI=p (18a)
DF = 0 : (18b)
The e¤ective interest rate on loans is R=p.
4.6 Local nanciers and hub-signaling
The entrepreneurs who organized and promoted [...] new ventures secured invest-
ment capital largely by relying on personal connections. [...] they could be based on
17
'L
2C 1C3
C
'H
Sp
Fp0
L
H
*C
pZP
Figure 3: Pooling equilibrium without hub-signaling
the recommendations of men who had established their expertise in the community,
as when Brush secured backing for the Linde Air Products Company simply by as-
suring local businessmen of the merits of the technology. (Lamoreaux, Levenstein,
and Sokolo¤, 2004, pg. 27)
Throughout phase I, entrepreneurs have had close and repeated relationships with the
hub rm. The hub rm, thus, have a rough idea on the quality of the projects of
these entrepreneurs. For the moment, I assume that this information is costless and
comes naturally due to repeated interaction between the parties in phase I. Section 5.1
generalizes the model to a case in which gathering this information is costly.
The hub rm has close links with local nanciers, too. These links can be due to
ongoing or past nancial relationships or it could be the case that these local nanciers
are organized by the hub rm or by its past employees as evidenced by Lamoreaux,
Levenstein and Sokolo¤ (2004). It is known to be a successful rm that has been able
to manage very successful business projects in the area.
Potential lenders have to be convinced that the projects they plan to nance are promis-
ing and they can trust the expertise of the hub rm in evaluating them. Therefore, local
nanciers can make use of the local information that the hub rm has, which a bank
cannot credibly gather. Assume that the hub rm honestly communicates its ideas for
the moment which allows me to focus on the value of network relationships in isolation.
The credibility of this information is discussed in section 5.2.
Suppose the hub rm sends a signal  to the local nanciers that takes on two values:
good and bad. That is, it conveys its beliefs about every entrepreneur in the network by
labeling them as good (an entrepreneur with a high success probability project) or bad
(an entrepreneur with a low success probability project). It can, of course, make wrong
judgments. The probability of a good signal for an entrepreneur with a high success
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probability project is
Prf = good j i = H ^ i 2 Ng = x x 2 [0; 1] ; (19)
and that for an entrepreneur with a low success probability project is
Prf = good j i = L ^ i 2 Ng = y y 2 [0; 1] : (20)
Then, conditional on a good signal from the hub rm, the Bayesian probability that a
loan applicant is an entrepreneur with a high success probability project is
Prfi = H j  = good ^ i 2 Ng = Prfi = H ^  = good ^ i 2 Ng
Prf = good ^ i 2 Ng =
x
x+ (1  )y ;
(21)
and conditional on a bad signal from the hub rm, the Bayesian probability that a loan
applicant is an entrepreneur with a high success probability project is
Prfi = H j  = bad ^ i 2 Ng = (1  x)
(1  x) + (1  )(1  y) : (22)
Similar expressions for the Bayesian probabilities that a loan applicant is an entrepreneur
with a high and a low success probability project are given by
Prfi = L j  = good ^ i 2 Ng = (1  )y
x+ (1  )y (23a)
Prfi = L j  = bad ^ i 2 Ng = (1  )(1  y)
(1  x) + (1  )(1  y) ; (23b)
respectively. Thus, the belief of the hub rm about the projects of the network entre-
preneurs can be imperfect. That is, it can label a good project as a bad project with
probability 1   x and a bad project as a good project with probability y. However, a
rm that has engaged in many innovative activities and formulated successful business
strategies, such as Brush Electric Company, would in average make valuable judgments
about business projects. Given that it have had continuous relationship with the network
entrepreneurs in phase I, thus, it is reasonable to assume that the hub rms judgments
about the network entrepreneurs are useful in average. Technically, this is achieved if
monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) holds in the distribution of types. This
requires the ratio the Bayesian probability of a good signal to a bad signal is increasing
with the type of the projects. That is, the ratio (21)=(22) should be greater than the
ratio (23a)=(23b) should hold, which boils down to the following assumption.
Assumption 3 (Informativeness of Signals) Signals are informative: x > y.
Suppose that these signals are received by at least two local nanciers and they trust
these signals. I assume that signals are private information between the hub rm and
the local nanciers and cannot be credibly communicated to anyone else. However, local
nanciers do know that the hub rm has contacts with other local nanciers, too. These
local nanciers have some local information that none of the other lenders has.
In the case in which there is no hub-signaling, the average success probability of the loan
applicant pool is given by p and, as is shown in (18a) and (18b), the equilibrium lending
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interest rate is R=p for any loan granted. However, the extra information that the local
nanciers have give them to ability to price discriminate between network entrepreneurs
and stand-alone entrepreneurs. Suppose they grant the loans only if they get a good
signal from the hub rm. The average success probability of network entrepreneurs with
a good signal, p^, is
p^ =
xpH + (1  )ypL
x+ (1  )y : (24)
A similar analysis of section 4.5 with new (Bayesian) incentive constraints and (Bayesian)
zero prot conditions shows that local nanciers o¤er a lending interest rate of R=p^ to
any network entrepreneur with a good signal. A simple comparison of (17) and (24)
depicts that p^ > p as long as x > y, which is assumed in Assumption 3. Therefore,
the existence of a network allows local nanciers to provide cheaper loans to network
entrepreneurs with a good signal.
Those who were labeled with a bad signal are declined from the privileged loan provided
by the local nanciers.11 From the perspective of the local nanciers, the average success
probability of the loan applicants that are standing alone, p, is given by
p =
pH + (1  )pL
 + (1  ) : (25)
It is easy to show that p < p. However, note that those who could not get a privileged
loan from the local nanciers can apply for loans as stand-alone rms. This changes
the average success probability of the stand-alone loan applicants. Having known this,
banks and local nanciers set the price of the loans accordingly. The new average success
probability outside the network is now given by
~p =
[(1  x) + (1  )]pH + [(1  y)(1  ) + (1  )(1  )]pL
[(1  x) + (1  )] + [(1  y)(1  ) + (1  )(1  )] : (26)
It is also easy to show that ~p < p. The reason for this is the following. The average
success probability of the whole population is p. A sample of this population, which
has an average success probability of p^ > p, is in the network. Therefore, the average
success probability of the remaining population has to be less than p.
Suppose this static game is played at every period. Then, the network of the hub rm
which is known to be a successful rm incubates start-ups with better chances of
survival in average than the rest of the start-ups. This means a better match of capital to
ideas in the network. I record this result in the following proposition. That is, networks
successful rms give births to successful rms.
Proposition 3 Success breeds success in the network.
Figure 4 shows the a¤ect of hub-signaling in and of itself in the credit market. In
the absence of hub-signaling all lenders o¤er one pooling contract for all borrowers.
In this case, the zero prot condition is given by ZPp and the equilibrium contract is
11Here is an analogy. NBER grants some professors as "faculty research fellows". Some of these are
not tenured even though they have strong research records.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium contracts with and without hub-signalling
characterized by C, which is the same C shown in Figure 3. When there is hub-
signaling, the local nanciers can e¤ectively price discriminate between the two groups
of borrowers. The rst group is composed of network entrepreneurs that are labeled
with a good signal by the hub rm. Given the information structure, local nanciers
have informational advantage about the quality of these rms. The zero prot condition
is given by ZPp^ for the loans they provide to the entrepreneurs with good signals. The
equilibrium contract for this group is given by C. Note that this contract gives higher
payo¤s to the entrepreneurs in case of a good state at the end of the period. The second
group is composed of two di¤erent kinds of entrepreneurs: stand-alone entrepreneurs
and network entrepreneurs who are labeled with a bad signal by the hub rm, and
thus, declined from the privileged loans provided by the local nanciers. The average
success probability in this group is ~p and the zero prot condition is given by ZP~p for
the banks. The corresponding equilibrium contract is given by C. Note that C
leaves a smaller payo¤ to the entrepreneurs in the good state. Table 1 summarizes the
lending interest rates o¤ered by lenders.
Lending Interest Rate
for stand-alone for network
entrepreneurs entrepreneurs
without Banks R=p R=p
hub-signaling Local Financiers R=p R=p
with Banks R=~p R=~p
hub-signaling Local Financiers R=~p R=p^
Note: ~p < p < p^.
Table 1: Lending interest rates
The results would still go through even when the entrepreneurs are risk averse. In
section 5, I show that the existence of a network makes either both high and low success
probability entrepreneurs better o¤ or only the high success probability entrepreneurs.
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Being a part of the network is preferable by both parties in the former case. In the latter
case, low success probability entrepreneurs do not want to be a part of the network but
doing so would perfectly signal their types. Therefore, they would not leave the network
after learning their types. Instead they might want to give side payments to the hub rm
to collapse the informative signaling mechanism. As is shown in section 5, even with this
side payments a network would still persist. This suggests that the qualitative results
are robust even with risk averse agents noting that all entrepreneurs have freedom to
leave the network any time they want.
The results imply that the average success probability of start-ups that are nanced by
the privileged loans of the local nanciers are going to be more successful in average.
However, this does not mean that the region benets from it. As the model shows,
entrepreneurs rationed from the privileged loan can apply for loans as stand-alone en-
trepreneurs. In the end, although some of the entrepreneurs will be paying lower prices
for the loans, all rms will have access to credit and the distribution of types will be the
same with the case in which there is no hub-signaling. The only benet of the network
to the society is thus the fact that it is an incubator of relatively more high success
probability rms (that is  > ), which happens in phase I. In phase II, the network
creates an island of entrepreneurs that have access to cheaper loans and they are high
success probability rms in average.
One important point to note is that the performance of the economy is dependent on
the informativeness of the signals. Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) show that a nonmarket
institution (network of entrepreneurs in this paper) may be dysfunctional in the cases
in which it is informationally disadvantaged relative to the market institution. In this
paper, I assume that the signals are informative, but, from a social point of view, the
outcome of the economy is not any better than the equilibrium without a hub-signaling
mechanism. Therefore, nonmarket institutions may not only be dysfunctional when they
are informationally disadvantaged as in Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) but they may also
be useless for the goals of the society even though they have superior information about
the economy. The benets of the nonmarket institution accrue only to its privileged
members in terms of prices of the loans, but those who can enter into entrepreneurship
are still the same. However, this does not mean that the networks are completely useless
simply because networks can create more high success probability projects in phase I.
4.7 Monopolistic local nancier
An important thing to note is that the price of the loan that is o¤ered to the network
entrepreneurs does not necessarily decrease due to hub-signaling. This result is depen-
dent on the credit market specication. I assumed that the lenders are in a Bertrand
competition. In general lenders (in particular local nanciers) may have monopolistic
power which might prevent prices to go down. To see that, suppose for the moment
an extreme case in which there is only one local nancier that has access to the signals
of the hub rm. The extra information it has e¤ectively improves its expected non-
repayed loans such that if it were to compete with others, its zero prot condition would
be characterized by ZPp^ in Figure 4. However, the monopolistic local nancier does not
need to pass on this cost decrease to the loan applicants. It cannot achieve the complete
monopoly prots either since other lenders are o¤ering R=p. This is simply because
network entrepreneurs would apply for loans as stand-alone rms if the price of the loan
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is higher than R=p. Therefore, a monopolistic local nanciers sets the same loan price
that all others are currently o¤ering in the market and enjoy prots of R(1=p 1=p^) per
dollar lent. In general, the outcome depends on how informed the lenders are.
Petersen and Rajan (1994) assume that the decreases in cost of loanable funds are passed
on to the borrowers. In this model, cost of loanable funds which is nothing but the
risk-free interest rate R does not change. However, the monopolistic local nancier
expects to have a lower number of defaults. This e¤ectively decreases its expected losses,
but it does not need to reect this chance to the borrowers since it has monopoly power.
Note that, this has nothing to do with the fact that success breeds success in the network.
Even though the price of the loans does not go down in the case of a monopolistic local
nancier, there is still a better match of capital with the ideas among those who are
nanced by the privileged loan of the local nancier. That is, the average success
probability in the network is higher than that outside the network.12
5 Incentives for hub-signaling
Until now, I had assumed that there are certain incentives to the hub rm to form the
signaling mechanism. Here, I analyze these incentives for such an organization. From an
ex ante point of view, in the absence of hub-signaling, the market value of any start-up
rm, V, is given by
V = pY  RI ; (27)
regardless of whether the entrepreneur has a high or a low success probability project.
As it should be clear by now, credit markets undervalue the start-ups of entrepreneurs
with high success probability projects at the same time that they overvalue the start-
ups of entrepreneurs with low success probability projects. However, the hub-signaling
mechanism changes the levels of under- and overvaluation of start-ups. When there is
hub-signaling, the market value of the start-up of a network entrepreneur with a high
success probability project, VH , is
VH = [xp^+ (1  x)~p]Y  RI ; (28)
and that of a network entrepreneur with a low success probability project, VL, is
VL = [yp^+ (1  y)~p]Y  RI : (29)
The following proposition proves that network entrepreneurs with high success prob-
ability project always projects prefer hub-signaling, but the decision of the network
entrepreneurs with low success probability projects depends on the network size, num-
ber of high success probability projects in the network, and the informativeness of the
signals.
Proposition 4 A network entrepreneur with a high success probability project always
prefer hub-signaling. A network entrepreneur with a low success probability projects
12Outside of the network includes stand-alone entrepreneurs and network entrepreneurs who are
labeled with a bad signal. The second group is considered to be outside the network since they inde-
pendently apply for loans.
23
prefer hub-signaling when the network is large enough (given the signal structure  >
y
x+(1 )y ) or alternatively signals are not su¢ ciently informative (given the network
size xy >
1 (1 )
 ). Otherwise, they prefer status-quo.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
This suggests that, given the size of the network, hub-signaling makes the network
entrepreneurs with low success probability projects better o¤ only if the signals are
not so informative or, given the signal structure, it makes them better o¤ only if the
network is large enough. The reason for this result is the cross-subsidization induced by
contractual structure in the credit market. The start-ups of the network entrepreneurs
with low success probability projects are overvalued due to pooling contracts, and this
results in a wealth distribution from the owners of the undervalued start-ups to the
owners of the overvalued start-ups. Therefore, the pricing of the projects are not the
rst-best. Hub-signaling can improve the situation by mitigating the adverse selection
problem for some network entrepreneurs.
Ex ante, owners of the high success probability projects faces the chance of getting
a good signal with probability x at the same time that they face the possibility of a
bad signal in which case their project is going to be even more undervalued. However,
it turns out that the as long as signals are informative, the former e¤ect dominates
the latter. The situation is di¤erent for the network entrepreneurs with low success
probability projects. They always want to misrepresent themselves as if they had high
success probability projects. Given a network of a xed size, they still have a chance
to get a good signal if the signals are not very informative. This increases the level of
overvaluation to even higher values. However, if the signals are su¢ ciently informative,
they are more likely to be caught by the hub-signaling mechanism in which case they
have to get loans with an interest rate of R=~p. From another perspective, given the
signal structure of the hub rm, if the network is large enough, they still have a high
chance of not being caught by the signaling mechanism which might make them better
o¤ in expected terms. Therefore, in smaller networks with e¤ective signaling structure,
network entrepreneurs with low success probability projects are most likely to be worse
o¤ whereas in bigger networks with cumbersome signaling structures they might be
better o¤.
Corollary 1 When the network is su¢ ciently large (e.g.;  > yx+(1 )y ), both high and
low success probability project owners prefer hub-signaling.
Proof. The result directly follows from Proposition 4.
Focus now on to the more interesting case in which the network is su¢ ciently small
(e.g.;  < yx+(1 )y ). A network entrepreneur with a high success probability project is
willing to make a side payment to the hub rm to induce it to organize the hub-signaling
mechanism. This side payment can at most be VH   V. On the other hand, a network
entrepreneur with a low success probability project is willing to give a side payment
to the hub rm to prevent it from organizing the hub-signaling mechanism. This side
payment can at most be V   VL.
Whether the hub rm organizes the hub-signaling mechanism depends on the size of
the total side payments by both groups of entrepreneurs. As opposed to Campbell and
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Kracaw (1980), which states that there would be no incentives for signaling in such situ-
ations, I show here that there can be a rational expectations equilibrium in which there
are incentives to form hub-signaling. The basic intuition for the nonexistence of rational
expectations equilibrium in Campbell and Kracaw (1980) is that, since banks make zero
prots, the overvaluation of the rms should exactly match with the undervaluation of
rms in equilibrium. In our setting this corresponds to the following equalities.
[(1  x) + (1  )](pH   ~p) = [(1  y)(1  ) + (1  )(1  )](~p  pL)(30a)
x(pH   p^) = y(1  )(p^  pL) : (30b)
The rst one focuses on the cross-subsidization between entrepreneurs with high and
low success probability projects that are either stand-alone entrepreneurs or network
entrepreneurs who are rationed from privileged loans. The second one focuses on the
cross-subsidization among the network entrepreneurs who nances their start-ups with
the privileged loans. However, these are ex post realizations. From an ex ante point of
view, the total amount of overvaluation and undervaluation between network entrepre-
neurs are not equal to each other, which suggest that they may be a rational expectation
equilibrium. The following proposition formally proves this claim.
Proposition 5 Suppose the network is su¢ ciently small (e.g.;  < yx+(1 )y ). The
total increase in the market value of the start-ups of network entrepreneurs with high
success probability projects due to hub-signaling is higher than the total decrease in the
market value of the start-ups of the network entrepreneurs with low success probability
projects.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
In Proposition 4, when the network is su¢ ciently small, I showed that any network
entrepreneur with a high success probability project is willing to o¤er a side payment to
the hub rm to induce it to arrange hub-signaling and any network entrepreneur with a
low success probability project owner is willing to o¤er a side payment to the hub rm
to prevent it from arranging hub-signaling. Proposition 5 shows that the total amount
of side payments by the network entrepreneurs with high success probability. Moreover,
in Corollary 1, I show that both parties prefer hub-signaling if the network is su¢ ciently
large. Therefore, there may be incentives to form the hub-signaling mechanism, which
is stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 2 There may be incentives for the hub rm to arrange hub-signaling mech-
anism.
Proof. The result directly follows from Proposition 4, Corollary 1, and Proposition 5.
5.1 Costly signaling and the price of a signal
In the previous sections, I assume that the information required for signals is a natural
by-product of the close and repeated interaction between the hub rm and the network
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entrepreneurs. This is partly realistic because social relationships occasionally bring
useful information. In general, extracting this information can be costly to the hub rm
although it comes naturally from its interaction with the network entrepreneurs. This
section, which is based on Campbell and Kracaw (1980), sketches the more general case
in which the cost of information extraction is C per network entrepreneur.
Let the side payment that a network entrepreneur with an undervalued project is willing
to o¤er to the hub rm to induce hub-signaling be SH . This side payment can at most
be equal to the total amount of market value change in the start-up of the network
entrepreneur (SH < VH  V). Moreover, it has to cover the cost of information extraction
(SH > C). Therefore, if all network entrepreneurs with undervalued start-ups in the
network o¤er side payments to the hub rm, C < SH < (VH   V) has to hold,
or simply
C < SH < VH   V : (31)
In the same way, let the side payment that a network entrepreneur with an overvalued
project is willing to pay be SL. This side payment can at most be V   VL, and since
not producing the signal is costless it should also be higher than zero. Therefore, if
all network entrepreneurs with overvalued start-ups in the network o¤er side payments,
0 < (1  )SL < (1  )(V   VL) has to hold, or simply
0 < SL < V   VL : (32)
In the previous section, I show that the total amount of side payments by the network en-
trepreneurs with undervalued projects is higher than that by the network entrepreneurs
with overvalued projects. Therefore, if
(VH   V)  C > (1  )(V   VL) ; (33)
or simply,
C < VH + (1  )VL   V ; (34)
there can be incentives to form hub-signaling mechanism. This means that if the cost
of acquiring information is small enough, which is most likely to be the case for an
experienced hub rm such as Brush Electric Company, there will be hub-signaling.
Proposition 6 There exists a level of side payments such that the hub rm invests in
signal extraction.
5.2 Reliability of signals
Some of the men who invested their savings in the new rms were also o¢ cers and
directors of banks. For example, James J. Tracy, one of the original incorporators of
Brush Electric, became vice president of the Society for Savings after a long career
in various other Cleveland nancial institutions. Similarly, Myron T. Herrick, a
member of the Sperry Syndicate and one of the initial investors in National Carbon,
was secretary-treasurer and then president of the Society for Savings, a founder of
the Euclid Avenue National Bank, a director of the American Exchange National
Bank, and a director of the Gareld Savings Bank. Some of the inventors and
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other businessmen involved in these startups and spino¤s also helped to organize
nancial institutions during this period [...]. (Lamoreaux, Levenstein, and Sokolo¤,
2004, pg.29)
The implicit assumption in the above analysis is that the hub rm honestly conveys
the information it has to the local nanciers. In reality, the credibility of the signals is
questionable. One way of overcoming this problem for the local nanciers is to nance
the entrepreneurs in which the hub rm is also a claimant. That is, if the hub rm
claims the entrepreneurs it labels as good have higher average success probabilities in
average, then it should also be willing to invest in them. From the other way around,
the signals should be credible if the hub rm holds a su¢ cient amount of equity in the
portfolio of start-ups it labels with good signals.
Suppose, the hub rm has (x + (1   )y)W units of capital that it can allocate for
investment in start-ups of the network entrepreneurs. I assume that this wealth is
observable by local nanciers and W < I. I also assume that the local nanciers can
verify whether the hub rm really invested in the start-ups of the network entrepreneurs.
There are (x+ (1  )y) network entrepreneurs that the hub rm labels with a good
signal. An optimal investment strategy for the hub rm is to invest an equal share of its
wealth endowment into these start-ups, which means that it invests W units of capital
in each start-up in its portfolio to get  < 1 share of each of them.13 If it honestly
produces the signals, its payo¤ is
(x+ (1  )y)[p^(Y  R(I  W )) RW ]  C : (35)
The rst term is the net return on the investment. It gets  share of each start-up by
paying W for each. There are (x + (1   )y) such entrepreneurs and their average
success probability is p^. Those entrepreneurs need only I W units of capital from local
nanciers to start their rms. The second term is the cost of extracting information for
the hub rm.
Alternatively, the hub rm can choose [x+(1 )y] rms randomly without incurring
the cost of extracting information and announces them as the ones with good signals
to the local nanciers. If it does that, the average success probability in this random
sample is going to be
p = pH + (1  )pL ; (36)
where p < p^. This time, the payo¤ of the hub rm is
(x+ (1  )y)[p(Y  R(I  W )) RW ] : (37)
A simple comparison of (35) and (37) shows that, given W , honestly reporting signals
is preferable by the hub rm if it buys su¢ ciently large share of each start-up
 >
C
(x+ (1  )y)(Y  R(I  W ))(p^  p) : (38)
This suggests not only that the signals of the hub rm is reliable if it invests in the
13Note that debt is the optimal way of nancing in this model. However, here, there is a hub rm
which decides rst to buy an  share of the potential start-up, and then, the owner of this potential
start-up looks for nancing for the remaining part of the start-up. So, equity nancing here can be seen
as a device used by the hub rm to credibly send the signals to the local nanciers.
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portfolio of the start-ups for which it sends signals to the local nanciers but also a hub
rm has to have a deep pocket to credibly engage in hub-signaling. Some of the results
of this section are recorded in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 The signals of the hub rm is reliable if it buys a su¢ ciently large shares
of the portfolio of start-ups for which it sends signals to local nanciers.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I o¤er some thoughts on how success breeds success locally. I model the
pre-establishment period of start-ups. It is shown that a networking structure leads
potential entrepreneurs and hub rms to form what I call a rationed agglomeration in
which there are both entrepreneurs who interact with each other within the network
and other entrepreneurs in the same business outside the network. I also show that
established rms can help network entrepreneurs in obtaining nancing for their start-
ups. Although this help may improve the match of capital to ideas for some privileged
members of the network, the overall distribution of capital to ideas remain unchanged.
Therefore, the only benet of the networks to the society at large comes in phase I of the
pre-establishment period the period in which entrepreneurs develop innovative ideas
and work on business plans. That is, the networks can act as places for cross-fertilization
of ideas by generating a disproportionately high number of superior ideas.
It is clear that entrepreneurs have an incentive to join the network of a hub rm, but
some of them cannot do so because of the rationing by the hub rm. However, explaining
why a hub rm forms such a network is not entirely trivial. In the presence of asym-
metric information between the entrepreneurs and nanciers, the market overvalues the
start-ups with low success probabilities and undervalues the start-ups with high success
probabilities. When the hub rm shares its information about the entrepreneurs in its
network with the local nanciers, the level of under- and overvaluation is altered for the
network entrepreneurs. This sometimes makes both parties better o¤, and sometimes
makes only the start-ups with high success probabilities better o¤. In the former case,
when both parties are able to provide side payments to the hub rm, it is obvious that
there are incentives for the hub rm to communicate its views to the local nanciers.
It turns out that the hub rm also has incentives in the latter case, in which only the
start-ups with high success probabilities are beneted so that the interests of the two
parties are conicting. This is simply because the side payments that the start-ups with
the high success probabilities are willing and able to o¤er to the hub rm to induce
it to communicate its ideas to the local nanciers are greater in amount than the side
payments that the start-ups with low success probabilities are willing and able to pay
to the hub rm to induce it not to do so. This suggests that there are always certain
incentives for the hub rm to decrease the information gap between the entrepreneurs
and the local nanciers. One potential problem in this is that the hub rm might not
share its views honestly with the local nanciers if collecting this information is costly.
Nonetheless, the reliability of the signals is guaranteed whenever the hub rm buys
su¢ ciently large shares of the portfolios of start-ups in its network that it claims to be
promising, which is consistent with what is observed in the early stages of industrial
districts.
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I explain how the information generated in the networks of entrepreneurs around estab-
lished rms and start-ups can mitigate the adverse selection problems for some privi-
leged members of the network by decreasing the information gap between the network
entrepreneurs and local nanciers. This is one explanation why we observe successful
agglomerations such as those found in Cleveland, Ohio in the ninetieth century. It re-
mains unexplained, however, why some agglomerations rise up repeatedly while others
rise and decline.
While writing this paper, I came across the Green Paper: Entrepreneurship in Europe
(European Commission, 2003) which stresses that networks between established rms
and start-ups have been becoming increasingly important. Having understood the vital-
ity of such networks in 1997 the Federal Ministry of Education and Research in Germany
launched a program called EXIST to increase regional cooperation between the economic
and scientic actors by forming networks between them. Two of the aims of the program
are to increase knowledge spillovers and foster the pool of potential entrepreneurs by
creating networks that would otherwise not formed. This suggests the feasibility of the
idea that the government might improve the structures of the networks. The normative
conclusions and public policies are left for future research.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Assume instead there is a separating equilibrium. The Bertrand competition among the lenders
requires that they make zero prots in an equilibrium. Therefore, if there were separating con-
tracts, lenders have to make zero prots from each of these contracts. The zero prot condition
for the contract designed for entrepreneurs with a high success probability projects is given by
pH(Y   GH)  (1  pH)BH = RI ; (A-1)
and that for an entrepreneur with a low success probability project is given by
pL(Y   GL )  (1  pL)BL = RI : (A-2)
The corresponding iso-prot lines are given by
pH
G
H + (1  pH)BH = YH (A-3a)
pL
G
L + (1  pL)BL = YL ; (A-3b)
where YH and YL are the levels of YH and YL. If there were a pooling contract eqs. (A-1)-(A-3b)
have to be satised simultaneously. However, note that (A-1) is parallel to (A-3a) and (A-2) is
parallel to (A-3b) in the B   G space, and the slope of the former group is smaller than that
of the latter group. Given limited liability, these four equations cannot be satised at the same
time with a separating contract. A contradiction is obtained. Therefore, there are no separating
contracts.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4
If the di¤erence between VH and V is positive, the market value of the start-up of a network
entrepreneur with a high success probability project increases due to hub-signaling. That is,
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VH   V = [xp^+ (1  x)~p]Y   pY > 0. This holds when
xp^+ (1  x)~p > p : (A-4)
By substituting for ~p, p, and p^, one can get
(pH   pL)(x  x  (1  )y)[x  (x+ y(1  ))( + (1  ))]
[x+ (1  )y][1  (x+ y(1  ))] > 0 :
It can be easily veried that the terms (pH   pL) and [x+ (1  )y] are positive. Then, (A-4)
holds when
(x  [x+ (1  )y])[x  (x+ y(1  ))( + (1  ))]
1  (x+ y(1  )) > 0 :
The rst term in the numerator is positive because x+(1 )y is a weighted average of x and y,
and therefore, it is between x and y. Multiplying this with , one get a number between x and
y, which is denitely less than x. Moreover, by similar reasoning, the term in the denominator
is also positive since (x+ y(1  )) is less than one.
Below is the second term in the numerator.
[x  (x+ y(1  ))| {z }
<x
( + (1  ))| {z }
<
> 0 : (A-5)
As it is obvious,  + (1   ) is in between  and , and thus, it is less than . Above I
have already shown that x + y(1   ) < x. Then, the second term in (A-5) has to be less
than x, which implies that the term is positive. Therefore, hub-signaling makes the network
entrepreneurs with a high success probability projects better o¤.
Similarly, if the di¤erence between V and VL is positive, the market value of the start-up of a
network entrepreneur with a low success probability decreases due to hub-signaling. That is,
V   VL = pY   [yp^+ (1  y)~p]Y > 0. This holds when
yp^+ (1  y)~p < p : (A-6)
By substituting for ~p, p,and p^, one can get
(pH   pL)[y   x  (1  )y)][x  (x+ y(1  ))( + (1  ))]
[x+ (1  )y][1  (x+ y(1  ))] < 0 :
Above I have already shown that x (x+y(1 ))(+(1 )) > 0 and 1 (x+y(1 )) > 0.
Then, it is left to nd out when y   x  (1  )y) < 0 holds:
y   x  (1  )y) < 0
x
y
>
1  (1  )

 <
y
x+ (1  )y :
This means that hub-signaling makes the network entrepreneurs with a low success probability
projects better o¤ only if  > yx+(1 )y (given the signal structure) or
x
y <
1 (1 )
 (given the
network size).
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 5
For any start-up of a network entrepreneur with a high success probability project VH   V =
[xp^+(1 x)~p]Y   pY > 0 and there are  of them. In the same way, for any start-up of a network
entrepreneur with a low success probability project, V   VL = pY   [yp^ + (1   y)~p]Y > 0 and
there are 1  of them. Hence, the increase in the market value of the start-ups of entrepreneurs
with high success probability projects due to hub-signaling is higher than the total decrease
in the market value of the start-ups of entrepreneurs with low success probability projects if
[xp^+ (1  x)~p  p] > (1  )[p  yp^  (1  y)~p] or alternatively if the following inequality holds.
[x+ (1  )y]p^+ [(1  x) + (1  )(1  y)]~p > p : (A-7)
By substituting for ~p, p, and p^ into (A-7), one can get
xpH + (1  )ypL + [(1  x) + (1  )(1  y)]
 [(1  x) + (1  )]pH + [(1  y)(1  ) + (1  )(1  )]pL
[(1  x) + (1  y)(1  )] + (1  ) > p :
After some manipulation
xpH + (1  )ypL + [(1  x) + (1  )]pH + [(1  y)(1  ) + (1  )(1  )]pL
 + (1 )[(1 x)+(1 )(1 y)]
> p
or
(1 )[xpH+(1 )ypL]
[(1 x)+(1 )(1 y)] + [ + (1  )]pH + [(1  ) + (1  )(1  )]pL
 + (1 )[(1 x)+(1 )(1 y)]
> p :
However, the second term on the numerator is nothing but p. Therefore,
(1 )[xpH+(1 )ypL]
[(1 x)+(1 )(1 y)] + p
 + (1 )[(1 x)+(1 )(1 y)]
> p
(1  )[xpH + (1  )ypL] + [(1  x) + (1  )(1  y)]p
[(1  x) + (1  )(1  y)] + (1  ) > p
or
(1  )[xpH + (1  )ypL] + [(1  x) + (1  )(1  y)]p
> p[[(1  x) + (1  )(1  y)] + (1  )] :
Arranging gives
(1  )[xpH + (1  )ypL] > p[(1  )  [(1  x) + (1  )(1  y)](1  )]
(1  )[xpH + (1  )ypL] > p(1  )[1  (1  x)  (1  )(1  y)]
xpH + (1  )ypL > p[1  (1  x)  (1  )(1  y)]
xpH + (1  )ypL > p[x+ (1  )y]
xpH + (1  )ypL
x+ (1  )y > p
p^ > p :
Therefore, the right hand side of (A-7) is always greater than the left hand side.
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